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We have considered the application of the two maxims and their
conflict with each other. The practical has modified the theoretical, and as a result, the language of the law to the landowner is,
while your dominion extends from the earth's centre to the highest
heavens, you must exercise it according to the dictates of common
sense and justice, and so protect your neighbor in the enjoyment
of his equally extensive right.
GARNET PENDLETON.
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NIBOYET v. NIBOYET.
The English Divorce Court has jurisdiction to grant a divorce against a foreigner.
A marriage was solemnized at Gibraltar between a Frenchman and an Englishwoman The husband resided for several years in England, but being a consul
for France he retained his domicile of origin. The wife presented a petition for a
divorce, alleging adultery committed in England and desertion. The husband
appeared under protest, and prayed to be dismissed. Held, that the court had
jurisdiction to grant a divorce.

R. J. PHILLIMORE dismissing a
petition for a divorce.
The question was, whether the court had jurisdiction to receive
a petition for divorce presented by a wife, her domicile of origin
being English, the marriage having been celebrated at Gibraltar,
and the alleged adultery having taken place in England; the
domicile of the husband, who was a consul for France, having been
and continuing to be French, although he was residing in England.
APPEAL from an order of Sir

Sir R. J. PHILLIMORE dismissed the petition on the ground that
the court had no jurisdiction as against a foreigner.
Inderwick, Q. C., and Swabey, for the petitioner.-There is no
case in which a natural-born subject of the Queen has been refused
a divorce on any question of domicile. The divorce might not be
recognised in some other countries, but such divorces are constantly
granted in every Protestant country. The wife being domiciled
here is entitled to a divorce vdleat quantum. The husband and
wife were in this country; the offence was committed here, and
Lhey are entitled to the benefit of the law of this country: Brodie v. Brodie, 2 Sw. & Tr. 259; Rateliff v. Batclff, 1 Id.
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467; lFirebracev. Firebrace,47 L. J. (P., S. & D.) 41; Deek v
Deck, 2 Sw. & Tr. 90; 29 L. J. (P., M. & A.) 129. If every
natural-born subject can, under §§ 27 and 31 of the Act 20 & 21
Vict. c. 85, present a petition, she must have a right to a divorce:
Bond v. Bond, 2 Sw. & Tr. 93; 29 L. J. (P., M. & A.) 143; Le
Sueur v. Le Sueur, 1 Prob. & Div. 139; Simonin v. Mallae, 2 Sw.
& Tr. 67 ; 29 L. J. (P., M. & A.) 97 ; Sottomayor v. De Barro8,
3 Prob. & Div. 1. The question could not have arisen formerly,
because the canon law was the same all over the world. The statute 23 Hen. 8, c. 9, as to citation out of the jurisdiction, did not
apply if the defendant had appeared. In Lindo v. Belisario, 1
Hagg. Cons. 216, the court decided the question. Donegal v.
Donegal, 3 Phillim. 597, may have been collusive in its origin.
In Shaw v. Attorney-General, Law Rep. 2 Prob. & Div. 156; and
Lloyd v. Petitjean, 2 Curt. Cons. 251, the court assumed jurisdiction. No doubt, in many of these cases, the parties did not
appear, but that cannot have given the court jurisdiction. It must
be admitted that much of the reasoning in Shaw v. Gould, Law
Rep. 3 H. L. C. 55, is against the petitioner; but all the lords did
not concur in the reasoning. The observations in Warrender v.
Warrender,2 Cl. & Fin. 488, are strongly in favor of the petitioner.
Gorst, Q. C., and Greenwood, for the Queen's proctor.-It is
clear that every husband and every wife in every country cannot
apply to this court for a divorce. One, at all events, must be domiciled here, and the wife's domicile is that of her husband, so that
here both are foreigners: Deck v. Deck, 2 Sw. & Tr. 90, is the
only case in which the court has pronounced for a divorce between
persons not domiciled here. But the courts of one country ought
not to make orders affecting the personal status in another country
of a person not domiciled here. Even if English subjects by origin
domiciled abroad can be divorced here, it does not follow that this
court will interfere against a person who has been domiciled here.
In Bond v. Bond, 2 Sw. & Tr. 93, the court is said to have followed
Deck v. Deck; but tliat is not so. Brodie v. Brodie, 2 Sw. & Tr.
259, referred to in Manning v. Manning, Law Rep. 2 Prob. & Div.
223, is in favor of the respondent, and so is Wilson v. Wilson,
Law Rep. 2 Prob. & Div. 435. Sottomayer v. De Barros, 3 Id.
1, was a very strong case. The doubts as to the wife's domicile
raised in Dolphin v. Robins, 7 H. L. C. 390, were not shared by
all -)f their lordships. Pitt v. Pitt, 4 Macq. 627, shows that there
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cannot be a divorce granted unless the parties are domiciled here.
Yeh'erton v. Yelverton, 1 Sw. & Tr. 574, and Tollemache v. Tollemaclhe, Id. 557, show that the court has no jurisdiction in such
cases.
JAMES, L. J.-This case was argued and decided in the court
below, and has been argued before us, exclusively on one question,
viz: whether an English court has or has not jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage tie between persons not domiciled in England,
the dissolution of such a marriage being the real and avowed object
of the petitioner in the suit. That such should be the avowed
object of the suit, and that the parties should be desirous of having
the opinion and decision of the court on that question, does not preclude the court from seeing, or enable the court to avoid seeing,
what the real question raised by the pleadings is. The petitioner,
after alleging the marriage at Gibraltar, alleges desertion for two
years and upwards without reasonable excuse, and adulterous intercourse committed and continued from the year 1867 down to the
institution of the proceedings, at and in the neighborhood of Sunderland, in the county of Durham, and therefore in England. The
prayer is that the court would be pleased to decree the dissolution
of the marriage, but to that is added the usual prayer for general
relief. The exact words are, "such other and further relief in the
premises as to this honorable court may seem meet." I read these
words as being in substance such further or other relief. The
respondent appeared under protest, and pleaded to the jurisdiction
in substance that he was by birth and domicile a Frenchman, and
that although he had resided in England from the year 1862 to the
year 1869, and afterwards from the year 1875 to the commencement of the suit, he so resided in the discharge of his duties in the
consular service of his own government. And he sums up thus:
"During the whole period of the respondent's absence from France
aforesaid, he retained his French domicile, and has not now and
never had any domicile in England. By reason of the premises,
this honorable court has not had any jurisdiction to dissolve the
marriage of the respondent with the petitioner." And he prayed
to be dismissed from all further observance of justice in this suit.
But whether the respondent is or is not right in his contention thaat
the court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage, the plea to
the jurisdiction must fail if the petitioner be entitled to any relief
whatever in the suit, on the facts stated in her petition.

NIBOYET v. NIBOYET.

Can there be any doubt that before the English Act of Parliament transferring the jurisdiction in matrimonial causes from the
church and her courts to the sovereign and her court, the injured
wife could have cited the adulterous husband before the bishop, and
have asked either for a restitution of conjugal rights, or for a
divorce a mensa et thoro, and in either case for proper alimony ?
The jurisdiction of the Court Christian was a jurisdiction over
Christians, who, in theory, by virtue of their baptism, became
members of the one Catholic and Apostolic Church. The church
and its jurisdiction had nothing to do with the original nationality,
or acquired domiciles of the parties-using the word domicile in the
sense of the secular domicile, viz., the domicile affecting the secular
rights, obligations and status of the party. Residence, as distinct
from casual presence on a visit, or in itinere, no doubt was an important element; but that residence had no connection with and little
analogy to that which we now understand when we endeavor to
solve, what has been found so often very difficult of solution, the
question of a person's domicile. If a Frenchman came to reside in
an English parish, his soul was one of the souls, the care of which
was the duty of the parish priest, and he would be liable for any
ecclesiastical offence to be dealt with by the ordinary pro salute
animce. It is not immaterial to note that dioceses, and states or
provinces were not necessarily conterminous. The Channel Islands,
which are no part of England, are in the diocese of Winchester,
and the Isle of Man is in the province of York; and many similar
cases might be found on the Continent. And although the laws
of the state sometimes interfered by way of coercion, regulation or
prohibition with the Courts Christian, the latter acted proprio
vigore, and they administered their own law, not the law of the
state, and they administered it in their own name, and not in the
name of their sovereign. The language of the act creating the
existing court, strikingly illustrates this when it enacts that all
jurisdiction vested in or exercised by any ecclesiastical court or
person in England, &c., shall belong to and be invested in Her
Majesty. It was not previously vested in her, although she had
appellate jurisdiction as supreme ecclesiastical judge. If before
that act had passed, the facts alleged in this petition bad occurred,
and the injured wife had applied to the Bishop of Durham for such
relief in the matter as was then competent to him, is it possible to
conceive any principle on which the guilty husband could lemur
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to the Ordinary's jurisdiction? The wrong done in his diocese, the
offending party openly and scandalously violating the laws of God
and of the church in his diocese, why should he decline to interfere ?
What could it be to him whether the offender was born in any
other diocese or born in any other country,-Christian, heathen or
Mahomedan, and had not in the eye of the secular court abandoned his domicile therein? And what principle of international
law could there have been to create the slightest difficulty in the
way of a decree for restitution, for separation a vzensa et tkoro
or for alimony? The wrongdoer has elected to reside within the
local limits of the jurisdiction of the Church Court, and neither the
court of the state nor the church or state court of his own country has any ground for alleging that the Church Court appealed
to, is usurping a jurisdiction, when it, by ecclesiastical monition, declaration and censure, compels the offending party to give
proper redress, or declares the offended party to be thenceforth
relieved from the obligation to provide for or to adhere to the bed
and board of the other; which was what the decree of divorce,
a mensa et thoro, really amounted to. If I were asked to define,
and it were necessary to define, what in the particular case of
matrimonial infidelity, constituted a matter matrimonial in England at the time when the act was passed, I should define it to
be a case of infidelity where the matrimonial home was in England
-the matrimonial home in which the offended husband ought to
be no longer bound to entertain the unchaste wife, or in which
the chaste and offended wife ought to be no longer bound to
share the bed and board of the polluted husband-the matrimonial
home, the purity of which was under the watch and ward of the
church there. I will give two illustrations of my meaning. It
appears to me impossible to suppose that an English court would
lose its jurisdiction or not have jurisdiction because the guilty party
consorted with his or her paramour outside the territorial limits of
the diocese or on a journey. And, on the other hand, I do not
think that an English court ought to have exercised or would have
exercised jurisdiction in the case of a French matrimonial home by
reason of an act of infidelity "done during a visit, or in transit to
or through the English diocese. The proper court in that case
would have been a French court. I arrive, therefore, at the conclusion that the facts stated in the petition would have constituted a
matter matrimonial in England, in which some jurisdiction would,
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but for the passing of the act, have been vested in. and exercised
by an ecclesiastical court or person in England, and that such jurisdiction now belongs to and is vested in her Majesty. This appears
to me sufficient to dispose of the plea which denies all jurisdiction whatever in the subject-matter of complaint.
But the same considerations appear to me also sufficient to dispose of the question which was discussed and considered in the
court below, viz., whether the court can under the English statute,
decree a dissolution of the tie. The act was passed expressly "to
constitute a court with exclusive jurisdiction in matters matrimonial
in England, and with authority in certain cases to decree the disI read that as "in certain of such
solution of a marriage."
cases," "in certain of such matters matrimonial" in England.
And that is followed by the 27th section, which is quite universal
in its language. "It shall be lawful for any husband; * * * it
shall be lawful for any wife." That universality is, of course, to"
be limited by the object and purview of the act, and is to be read
thus: "And in any such matrimonial matter in England it shall
be lawful for any husband or wife, &c." And except such limitation I am unable to find any limitation which, on any principle of
construction, ought to be implied. Of course it is always to be
understood and implied that the legislature of a country is not
intending to deal with persons or matters over which, according to
the comity of nations, the jurisdiction properly belongs to some
other sovereign or state, But I do not find any violation of that
comity in the legislature of a country dealing as it may think just
with persons, native or not native, domiciled or not domiciled, who
elect. to come and reside in that country, and during such residence
to break the laws of God or of the land. I am unable, more
especially, to imply any limitation of the authority of the court
by reference to the principles of law which were, at the passing of
the act, in the course of development in the American courts,
where it is now settled that the jurisdiction is to be determined by
the domicile of the complaining party at the time of the complaint
brought. No such principle had then been established or recognised in any court in this kingdom, and, on the contrary, in one
very important division of the realm, Scotland, the Scotch courts
had exercised jurisdiction in entire disregard of any such principle.
The fact was present to the English legislature with full knowledge
of certain very painful and embarrassing consequences resulting
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from it. But the legislature did not think it neccessary or fit to
make any provision in that behalf. A Scotch divorce a vinculo,
between persons not Scotch by domicile, was held to be void in
England as to an English marriage; but so far as Scotland was
concerned, and so far as any consequences of the divorce would
have to be determined by the Scotch courts, the divorce was, to all
intents and purposes, valid and effectual. It is very inconvenient
and very distressing that two people should be husband and wife in
one country and not husband and wife in another; that their
marriage should be a lawful -marriage in one and bigamous in
another; that they should be compellable by the laws of a Christian
country to a cohabitation which, by the laws of another Christian
country, would be an adulterous intercourse. And if we could
find in the general application of the law, as laid down by the
American authorities, a satisfactory escape from the difficulty, we
should be sorely tempted to strain the construction of the English
statute to bring it into harmony with that law. But I do not find
any such satisfactory solution in that law. In the first place it
appears to me to be a violation of every principle to make the dissolubility of a marriage depend on the mere will and pleasure of
the husband, and domicile is entirely a matter of his will and
pleasure. It would be very desirable, no doubt, that a judicial
decree of dissolution of a marriage affecting the status of husband
and wife, a decree in rem, should be, if possible, recognised by
the courts of every other country, according to the principles of
international comity. But is such a result possible ? Would any
French court recognise the dissolution of a French marriage because
the French husband had been minded to establish his domicile in
England ?
In England a divorce a vinculo is only granted under certain
conditions, and with very careful precautions and stringent regulations to prevent its being the result of collusion between the parties.
But supposing the collusion to assume the form of an abandonment
of the English domicile, and the establishment of a new domicil in
some country where a divorce can be obtained, almost if not quite,
by mutual consent and arrangement? Would an English court, or
ought it to recognise such a dissolution of the marriage tie, and
allow the English wife, whose original domicile would be restored
thereby, to return to this country and contract a valid marriage
here ? Moreover, a dissolution of the marriage for adultery is only
VOL. XXVI.--69
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one of the modes by which the status or alleged status of husband
and wife is judicially determined. A decree of nullity of a pretended marriage is quite as much a decree in rent, and has all the
consequences. HBow would it be possible to make domicile the test
of jurisdiction in such a case? Suppose the alleged wife were the
complainant, her domicile would depend on the very matter in controversy. If she was really married, her domicile would be the
domicile of her husband; if not married, then it would be her own
previous domicile. If domicile is required to give jurisdiction, that
requisite could not be supplied by the negligence or consent of the
party; and a decree for dissolution would always be liable to be
opened by a fresh litigation raising the question-often a most difficult question-of the domicile.
I find myself unable to arrive at the conclusion that the domicile
of the complaining party ought to determine the existence of the
limits of the jurisdiction given by the English statute to the English court. The only limitation which I can find is the limitation
of the jurisdiction to those matters which come under the category
of matrimonial matters in England, to every one of which the English law, with all its consequences, so far as England is concerned,
must be applied. I have endeavored to ascertain what such a matter is, and I have arrived at the conclusion that the present case
comes within that category. It is a misfortune that that law with
its consequences may not be recognised in another country, but
that misfortune inevitably arises from an irreconcilable conflict of
laws produced by the irreconcilable views of different Christian
communities as to the dissolubility or indissolubility of the marriage
tie, or the sufficiency of the grounds for a dissolution. I do not
think that I am overruling any English case in holding that on the
facts stated in this petition the wife is entitled to the relief she asks,
or in layilig down that where and while the matrimonial home is
English, and the wrong is done here, then the English jurisdiction
exists and the English law ought to be applied.
Protest overruled and action remitted.
COTTON,

L. J., concurred.

BRETT,

The Act of Parliament (20 & 21
Vict. c. 85), under which the present
Divorce Court in England was constituted, transferred to it all jurisdiction
formerly vested in the ecclesiastical

L. J., dissented.

courts, and was passed expressly to
"constitute a court with exclusive
jurisdiction in matters matrimonial in
England." It should be borne in mind
that the former ecclesiastical courts
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were purely spiritual courts, and previous to the reformation, were but part
of an universal system, emanating from
the See of Rome, the ultimate appeal
from which was to Rome itself. The
canon law was the law administered.
Hence, no divorce a vinculo, but merely
a eensa et thoro, was permitted, and
sucn continued to be the case up to the
passing of the present Divorce Act.
Previous to that time nothing short of
a private Act of Parliament, which is
itself a special piece of legislation,
could dissolve a marriage, and even
that legislative act was never resorted
to prior to the Reformation, after which
event all the Pope's jurisdiction in matters ecclesiastical was transferred to the
king, but even that did not embrace
the right to grant a divorce a vincslo.
The appeal from the Ecclesiastical
Courts lay henceforth to the king, who
exercised that authority through a committee or house of delegates, whose
jurisdiction was subsequently conferred
on the judicial committee of the Privy
Council, and eventually by the 56th
sect. of 20 & 21 Viet. c. 85, was
transferred to the House of Lords.
From the very nature and origin of
the spiritual courts, they were open to
all who were resident in the respective
dioceses, into which England was
divided-every bishop having his court,
presided over by his chancellor, and
the law administered being the canon
law of Christendom, or the universal
law of the Latin church. Originally
then, there were no conflicting laws on
the subject of marriage and divorce existing in different countries, and hence
the question of domicile was immaterial ;
hut as various countries modified or
varied the rule of the canon law, the
question of domicile gradually assumed
a greater importance. But as in England the spiritual courts never claimed
to exercise the power of granting a
divorce a vinculo matrimonii, residence in
the diocese was deemed sufficient for

the ancient jurisdiction exercised by them
in matrimonial matters, viz., that of
decreeing what is now termed a judicial
separation. The modern Act of Parliament having, however, constituted
an entirely original tribunal, having
power to decree a dissolution of the
marriage itself, it becomes a serious
consideration, whether domicile is not
absolutely necessary to give such a
court jurisdiction, at all events in relation to divorces a vinculo, the grounds
for such divorces differing in different
countries, and some even disallowing
such a divorce altogether. This would
seem especially the case where the marriage itself has been contracted in a
foreign country, and the object sought
is to set aside that contract. The lez
loci of the contract must be respected,
and all the rights and duties incident to
it, should be enforced by the municipal
laws of the country in which the parties
happen to be resident, even though not
domiciled.
Such is only international comity. Even a judicial separation is perfectly compatible with the
relief to which a temporary resident
may be entitled, but to affect wholly to
dissolve a foreign marriage, which perhaps is indissoluble in the country
where it was contracted, without first
requiring that the applicant should
become domiciled, or in other words,
should have evidenced his voluntary
intention exuere patriam, would scarcely
be in accordance with the comity of
nations, or with that reciprocity which
the true spirit of the jus gentium demands.
In Scotland, the spiritual courts have
been long since swept away, in fact
ever since the disestablishment of the
Episcopal Church, and the transfer, of
their jurisdiction to the Court of Session, where the civil. not the canon law,
was accepted. The law of divorce being
no longer regulated by the law of the
church, and divorces a vinculo being
permitted upon various grounds in
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Scotland, may probably explain the
requirement of domicile in divorce suits
instituted in the Scotch courts.
The Scotch law in this branch of
jurisprudence, being sui generis, and
differing from the general law of Europe,
including England, would naturally
insist upon domicile to give their courts
jurisdiction over foreigners in a matter
of such a peculiar and exceptional
character as divorce. Their special and
exceptional jurisdiction would of itself
necessitate a special domicile. But we
see in the case of Solley, where a man
married in England, but divorced in
Scotland, and remarried in England,
was nevertheless convicted of bigamy
in England and sentenced to transportation, how seriously the Scotch law
might, at times, conflict with that of
England. But yet in that case the conflict arose rather out of the doctrine
then held in England of the indissolubility of marriage, except by a special
Act of the Legislature, than out of the
application of the doctrine of domicile.
The English spiritual courts were still
clinging to the doctrine of the Roman
Church on the subject of marriage. The
canon law, the common law of Christendom previous to the Reformation,
was still their rule of faith; in one
word, the English canonists were at
variance with the Scotch covenantors.
Between the two, poor Solley was sacrificed. But now that matters matrimonial in England are taken out of the
jurisdiction of the spiritual courts, and
divorces a vinculo matrinonii are
granted by a purely secular court, no
longer necessitating a special legislative
interposition, the canon law in such
suits being abrogated, and a jurisdiction
sui generis established, under which divorces are decreed upon principles and
evidence such as the ancient canon law
of Europe wholly repudiated, a domicile
in the country seems essential to give
such a court jurisdiction over marriages
contracted in a foreign country, and to

afford a locus standi to a suitor demanding that the foreign contract be rescinded. The recognition of the foreign contract, as has been before observed, is a
matter of international obligation requiring no domicile either to constitute, establish or enforce, but its dissolution
upon certain grounds which each
country prescribes for itself, irrespective of any general international
agreement or comity, surely demands a
domicile, either of "origin" or " by operation of law," to entitle the applicant
to prosecute his suit; and indeed such
requirement is only consistent with respect for the jurisdiction of the original
contract. The decision before us, of
the Lords Justices of Appeal, is one of
great international importance, and will
doubtless be reviewed by the House of
Lords, where, in addition to the law
Lords, the House will have the able assistance of the common-law judges to
enable them to arrive at a satisfactory
conclusion on a matter of such vital interest. In the interim, itmay not be
altogether unedifying if we presume
even to anticipate their lordships' judgment, by the aid of cases though not
altogether analogous, yet essentially
connected with the matrimonial law of
England.
Although no domicile, in the legal
acceptation of that term, is required to
make a contract of marriage, the question is whether a legal domicile in England is necessary to create a jurisdiction
for dissolving a marriage contracted in
a foreign country, or even for granting
a judicial separation. Some observations of Lord BROUGiAM, in delivering
the judgment of the House of Lords in
Warrender v. W1"arrender, 2 C[. & Fin.
488, may possibly throw some light
upon this subject. "1A marriage," says
his lordship, "good by the laws of one
country is held good in all others where
the question of its validity may arise;
for the question always must be, did the
parties intend to contract marriage I
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* * All that the courts of one country

nave to determine is, whether or not
the thing called marriage, that known
relation of persons, that relation which
toose courts are acquainted with and
know how to deal with, has been validly
contracted in the other country where
the parties profess to bind themselves.
If the question is answered in the affirmative, a marriage has been had, the relation has been constituted ; and those
courts will deal with the rigl/s under it

according to the principles of the municipal law which they administer.
"BIut it is said that what is called the
essence of the contract must also be
judged of according to the lex loci contractus; and as this is a somewhat vague,
and for its vagueness a somewhat suspicious proposition, it is rendered more
certain by adding that dissolubility or
indissolubility is the essence of the contract. Now I take this to be really petitlo principii. It is putting the very
question under discussion into another
form of words, and giving the answer
in one way. If it is said that the parties marrying in England must be taken
all over the world to have bound themselves to live until death or an Act of
Parliament ' them do part,' why shall it
not be said also that they have bound
themselves to live together on such
terms, and with such mutual personal
rights and duties as the English law recognises and enforcest Those rights
and duties are just as much of the essence as dissolubility or indissolubility;
and yet all admit, all must admit, that
persons married in England, and settled
in Scotland, will be entitled only to the
personal rights which the Scotch law
sanctions, and will only be liable to
perform the duties which the Scotch law
imposes. Indeed, if we are to regard
the nature of the contract in this respect
as defined by the lex loci, it is difficult
to see why we may not import from
Turkey into England a marriage of such
Anature as that it is capable of being

followed by, and subsisting with another, polygamy being there the essence of
the contract. * * * Indeed, another
consequence would follow from this doctrine, of confounding with the nature of
the contract that which is only a matter
touching the jurisdiction of the courts,
and their power of dealing with the
rights and duties of the parties to it. If
there were a country in which marriage
could be dissolved without any judicial
proceeding at all, merely by the parties
agreeing in pais to separate, every
country ought to sanction a separation
in pais there, and uphold a second marriage contracted after such a separation."
The learned lord, speaking for the
House of Lords, draws a distinction between the incidents and the essence of
the marriage contract. " The fallacy of
the argument that indissolubility is of
the essence of the marriage contract,
appears plainly to be this: It confounds
incidents with essence; it makes the
right under a contract, or flowing from
and arising out of it, parcel of the contract; it makes the mode in which judicatures deal with those rights, and with
the contract itself, part of the contract,
instead of considering, as in all soundness of principle we ought, that the contract and all its incidents, and the rights
of the parties to it, and the wrongs committed by them respecting it, must be
dealt with by the courts of the country
where the parties reside, and where the
contract is to be carried into execution."
Although Lord BROUGHAMe is, as
usual, verbose, his meaning is, perhaps,
bestdiscovered in the following sentence,
forming part of the judgment, and which
is more terse than his usual style. In
this case of Warrender v. Warrender,
there had been a mutual separation, but
not by deed. Alluding to this, his lordship says : "I am of opinion there is
nothing in the separation, supposing it
had b en ever so formal and ever so
full in its provisions, which can by law
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displace the presumption of domicile
raised by the marriage, and subsisting
in full force so long as the marriage
endures."
If domicile is not required in order to
give the courts jurisdiction, then it
would appear that the law of the lex loci
c7ntractus must be introduced into the
question of dissolubility or indissolubility, equally as it is accepted in judging
of the validity of the marriage itself.
"At all events," says Lord BROUGHAM, "this is clear, and it seems decisive of the point, that if, on some such
grouud as this, a marriage indissoluble
by the lex loci is to be held indissoluble
everywhere, so, conversely, a marriage
dissoluble by the lex loci must be held
everywhere dissoluble. The one proposition is, in truth, identical with the
other. Now it would follow from
hence, or rather it is the same proposition, that a marriage contracted in Scotland, where it is dissoluble by reason
of adultery, or of non-adherence, is dissoluble in England, and that at the
suit of either party. Therefore, a wife
married in Scotland might sue her husband in our courts for adultery, or for
absenting himself four years, and ought
to obtain a divorce a vinculo matrimonii.
Nay, if the marriage had been solemnized in Prussia, either party might
obtain a divorce on the ground of incompatibility of temper; and if it had been
solemnized in France during the earlier
period of the revolution, the mere consent of the parties ought to suffice for
dissolving it."
Such appear to be some of the difficulties attending the dispensing with the
domicile of the parties in the country
where the divorce is sought. The marriage having been contracted abroad,
must be judged of by the lex loci contractus. No domicile having been acquired in the country where the divorce
is sought, and the marriage contract
being not an ordinary contract, but
forming part of the jus gentium, the dis-

solution of the contract must be governed by the same lex foci. It is one
thing for the country in which thp
divorce issought to deal with the rights
of the parties under the contract, according to the principles of its own
municipal law, and quite another thing
to dissolve or vary the contract itselt
upon the grounds of its own statutalle
municipal jurisdiction, without first requiring of the parties the status of domicile. But to import into its courts the
lez loci relating to the dissolution cr
even modification of the original contract would amount to little short of the
usurpation of the jurisdiction of a foreign country, in a matter that is not of
an international character. In Pitt v.
Pitt, 4 Macq. H. L. Cas. 627 ; 10 Jur.
N. S. 735, it was held that the husband,
who in 1860 had commenced proceedings in the Scotch courts for a divorce
on the ground of adultery, had not
acquired a Scotch domicile, and therefore the Court of Session had no jurisdiction. In the same case it was questioned whether a mere domicile of origin, or whether actual "habitation,"
or domicile by choice, is sufficient to
confer jurisdiction on the court ; but the
profession of a domicile of one kind or
another in the country where relief was
sought, was considered beyond question.
And further, if, as in this same case,
the husband goes away to avoid his
creditors, leaving his wife behind, his
wife cannot be compelled to become
subject to the tribunal of that country
in which her husband acquires a fresh
domicile : Pitt v. Pitt, supra.
The domicile must be a bonafide one.
So much so that even after the wife (who
was living apart from her husband) had
instituted a suit in the Scotch courts for
a divorce, on the ground of the husband's adultery, it was decided she had
no power as a.married woman to acquire
a fresh domicile : Dolphin v. Robins, 29
L. J.; P.M. & A. 11. In the case
before us, the plaintiff, an English-
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woman, had married a Frenchman at
Gibraltar in 1856, one year before the
passing of the present English Divorce
Act. At the time the suit was commenced by the wife the husband, though
resident in England, had acquired no
legal domicile there, and the wife cannot
acquire a domicile for herself, though
her husband may have been guilty of
such misconduct as would furnish her
with a defence to a suit by him for a
restitution of conjugal rights : Ydlerton
v. Yeverton, I Swab. & Trist. 585 ;
WMzitcornbe v. WMitcombe, 2 Curties 351.
A divorce granted in England might
not hold good in the country of her
husband's domicile, and she might be
placed in the anomalous position of remaining a wife in the country of her
husband's domicile, and of being a
divorced woman in the country where
he had no domicile. On theotherhand,
were she domiciled in the country where
the divorce was obtained, the country
where the original contract of marriage
was effected might acknowledge (we do
not say it would) the efficacy of a divorce
obtained in the country of his acquired
domicile, although it might have been
granted upon grounds such as would
not have been sufficient in the country
where the marriage was contracted.
At all events the want of domicile in
the former country would surely seriously interfere with any recognition of
the dissolution of a marriage contracted
in the country in which both husband
and wife still remained domiciled. It
is at all events desirable to bear in mind
that the lax loci of marriage is recognised all over the world, although where
the lex loci is such that persons of a particular religious faith cannot avail themselves of it, orthe difficulties of obtaining
a marriage conformable to the lex loci
are either insuperable or unreasonable,
the converse of the proposition is not,
in all cases, and under all possible circumstances, established : .Ruding v.
Smith, 2 Hagg. Cons. Rep. 382.

On the other hand divorce, not being
an international institution, but on the
contrary being expressly disallowed
even in some Christian countries, France
for instance, as indeed it was at one
time unknown throughout Christendom,
the lez loci is not necessarily recognised,
especially where the parties are not
domiciled in the country where the
divorce is sought.
It seems unreasonable that in the case
before us, where the husband's nationality precludes a divorce in his own
country,. that without naturalization or
even acquired domicile in another country he should be subjected by a foreign
country to that which the laws of his
own country refuse to recognise. Upon
the whole we think the opinion of Lord
Justice BRETT, to the effect that the
general words employed in the English
Divorce Act, viz., "matters matrimonial in England" should be confined to
matrimonial matters arising between
parties domiciled there; and such if we
mistake not, will probably be the opinion of the House of Lords shouid the
case be carried up, as to all appearance
it must, to that tribunal. In Warrenfer
v. Warrender, Lord BROUGHAM is reported to have said: "The resolution
in ,oley/'s case, was, that an English
marriage could not be dissolved by any
proceeding in the courts of any other
country for English purposes ; in other
words, that the courts of this country
will not recognise the validity of a
Scotch divorce, bat will hold the divorced wife dowable of an English estate,
the divorced husband, tenant thereof by
curtesy, and either party guilty of felony
by contracting a second marriage in
England ** *. As there would be nothing legally impossible in a marriage
being good in one country which was prohibited by the laws of another; so, if
the conflict of the Scotch and English
law be complete and irreconcilable,
there is nothing legally impossible in a
divorce being valid in the one country
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which the courts of the other may hold land as that which prevails in Scotland,
to be a nullity. * * *
not because it prevailed in Scotland, but
"We are now sitting as a Scottish because the matrimonial courts were no
Court of Appeal, this case coming longer, in either country, ecclesiastical
thence to us, and as such we must be or spiritual courts, having jurisdiction
guided by a reference to the principles over the consciences of all resident
of the law of that country. In English within episcopal dioceses, but temporal
cases, on the contrary, we sit as an courts authorized to decree that to which
English Court of Appeal, and must the spiritual courts had no claim, viz.,
equally be guided by the spirit of the a dissolution of the very sacrament of
marriage.
laws prevailing here."
To recur to Solley's case, reported in
In the same case, Lord LYNDHURST
said, " The main question in the appeal Russ. & Ryan's C. 0. 237. and which
is whether it is competent for the courts, arose A.D. 1812, both parties were Engon proof or admission of adultery, to lish and domiciled in England. This
pronounce a decree of divorce in a mar- case was referred to by Lord BRouoHAM
riage contracted and solemnized in when giving judgment as Lord High
England * * *.
Chancellor of Great Britain, in Jfc"1My mind is satisfied that it is the law Carty v. DeCraix, mentioned in IVarof Scotland that the courts there have render v. Warrender, where his lordwithout reference to the country where ship laid it down that an English marthe marriage was contracted, been used riage could not be dissolved or affected
from a very remote period to pronounce by a Danish or other foreign divorce.
But upon this case being quoted by
sentence of divorce for adultery."
Although in Warrender v. Warren- Lord LYNDHURST, in Warrender v.
der the marriage had taken place in Warrender, Lord BROUGHAM added:
England, yet the husband was a domi- "I think that this judgment (tVarrenciled Scotchman, and sued for a divorce der v. Warrender) does not break in on
in Scotland, and, as was said by Lord Solley's case. This is a decision in
LYNDHURST, "the basis of the whole reference to the law of Scotland, a
case" was that he was a Scotchman judgment founded on which we now, as
domiciled in Scotland. Though mar- a Court of Appeal, confirm. Solley's
ried in England to an English woman, case refers to the law of England."
In Pitt v. Pitt (A. D. 1864), before
the adultery committed in France, the
divorce suit instituted in Scotland, it referred to, the jurisdiction of the
was held by the House of Lords that Scotch court to grant a divorce a vinit is competent, under such circum- culo was dependent upon the respondent,
stances, to the Scotch courts to enter- who was an Englishman, having actain a suit to dissolve a marriage con- quired a bona fide domicile in Scottracted in England. The domicile, how- land; "a complete domicile in Scotever, was " the basis o. the whole land, and had thereby put off and lost
his original domicile in England."
case." This case occurred A. D. 1835,
nearly a quarter of a century before (Per Lord Chancellor, on the hearthe passing of the present English di- ing of that appeal.)
"The respondent's case," said Lord
vorce act, and although mention is
made in that act of "domicile,"
the CHELMSFORD, on the same occasion,
"depends, as his counsel admits, upon
question is whether it must not be as
sumed, in the absence of anything in the establishment of this complete legal
the act to the contrary, that the same domicile."
It also appears from Mrs. Bulkley'
rule should henceforth prevail in Eng-
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divorce case that the French law recognises foreign divorces among foreigners
married abroad, although divorces a vincudo are prohibited in France itself by
an act of the legislature of 1816, upon
purely social and not upon any fanciful ecclesiastical or spiritual ground ;
but the divorce must be obtained from
the court of the domicile, i. e., the
country, not necessarily of origin or
birth, but of actual domicile. In such
case the foreigner so divorced may contract another marriage in France itself
and with a French person. (See report
of this case in the judgment of the Court
of Cassation, together withra letter from
M Troplong, president of the court:
4 Mbacq. H. L. Rep. 648.
According to this French case a divorce even of English people, granted
by an English court of divorce, would
not be recognised in France, so as to
entitle the parties to marry again, unless
they had been domiciled in the country
where the divorce was granted.
This of itself is sufficient to insure a
mature reconsideration of the decision
of the Court of Appeal, in the case of
Niboyet v. Niboyet, especially as so high
an authority on international law as Sir
R. PHILIutORE, the judge of the English Divorce Court, agreed with Lord
Justice BRETT on the necessity of domicile to give the court jurisdiction in the
case of a foreigner or the English wife
of a foreigner suing for either a judicial
separation or an absolute divorce. As
the case at present stands, two judges
are of one opinion and two of another.
For the reasons before mentioned domicile might well be dispensed with in the
case of a judicial separation, though required in the case of an absolute divorce. The Scotch cases, also, before
referred to, appear to favor the view
of domicile being requisite to give the
Scotch courts jurisdiction in a suit for
VOL. XXVIL-70

an absolute divorce; and the American
law is acknowledged, as admitted by
Lord Justice JAMES, to determine the
jurisdiction by the domicile of the party
at the time of the complaint. It seems,
therefore, somewhat unreasonable that
the English court, by dispensing with
the requirement of domicile, should add
another to the many conflicts of laws
between nations, because no mention is
made of dpmicile in the Act of Parliament creating the modem divorce court-,
and it is scarcely logical to infer that because residence alone in a diocese, when
the spiritual court of each individual
bishop exercised a local jurisdiction,
was deemed sufficient for the purpose
of granting a divorce a 7nensa et thoro,
that, therefore, now that such spiritual
jurisdiction is abolished, and a court of
a temporal character is established, with
fall power to grant absolute dissolutions
of the marriage contract (a power never
claimed by the spiritual court), it should
be governed by the same qualification
with respect to jurisdiction, especially
when other nations cannot recognise
such a principle. It requires no further
argument to evidence that what might
well be sufficient in a case of a mere
separation from bed and board, might
be deemed, in an international point of
view especially, wholly insufficient in
the case of an absolute dissolution with
power to marry again, whereby such
serious social relationships are severed,
and perhaps new ties, with their almost
inevitable complications, created. The
present decision, if upheld, would convert the English Divorce Court into a
refuge for transient visitors, who might
thus be tempted to place themselves in
the anomalous position of being divorced in England to find themselves
still married when at home.
HUGH WEIGHETMAY.

DAVEY v. SHANNON.

High Court of Justice, Exchequer .Divisiozz.
DAVEY v. SHANNON.
An agreement not to set up a certain business during the joint lives of the
parties to the agreement, is an " agreement that is not to be performed within the
space of one year from the making thereof," within the meaning of the 4th
section of Statute of Frauds.

DEmURRER to part of a statement of defence.
The statement of claim was in the following terms:
1. The plaintiff is an outfitter and tailor, carrying on business in
Devonport.
2. In October 1866, the defendant entered into the employment
of the plaintiff as a foreman tailor, for a term of three years, on
the terms, amongst others, that if he should leave the plaintiff's
employment he should not engage in the service of any one carrying on, or himself carry on, the business of a tailor or outfitter
within five miles of Devonport aforesaid.
The defendant, on the expiration of the said period of three
years, continued in the employment of the plaintiff, on the like
terms, except as to the period of employment, until the end of
October 1877.
4. About the end of October 1877, the defendant left the plaintiff's employment, and shortly afterwards commenced to carry on
business as a tailor and outfitter in Fore street, Devonport, being
the same street in which the plaintiff carries on his said business;
and he has since continued and still continues to carry on such
business at the place aforesaid, contrary to the terms of the said
contract; by reason whereof the plaintiff has been, and will be,
injured in his said. business and deprived of custom and of profits
which he would otherwise have obtained.
The plaintiff claimed an injunction and damages.
The 4th paragraph of the statement of defence was as follows:
"The defendant says that neither the alleged contract of employment, nor any memorandum or note thereof, was or is in writing
signed by the defendant or any other person by him lawfully
authorized; and the defendant relies on the statute, commonly
known as the Statute of Frauds, as affording a defence to this
action, on the ground that the alleged contract was an agreement
not to be performed within the space of one year from the making
thereof."
To this paragraph the plaintiff demurred.
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A. Charles, Q. C., for the defendant.-Primafacie, this agreement is to last for the lives of the parties, and therefore it is not
to be performed within a year from the making: -Ely v. The Positive Government Security Life Assurance Company, Law Rep.
1 Ex. D. 20; Dobson v. Collis, 1 H. & N. 81; Knowiman v.
Bluett, Law Rep. 9 Ex. 1; affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber,
Law Rep. 9 Ex. 307; Sweet v. Lee, 3 M. & G. 452; Boberts
v. Tucker, 3 Ex. 632.
Anstie, for the demurrer.-This is not an agreement which need
be in writing in order to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. It is an
agreement which may possibly be performed within the year, for
there is no presumption of the continiuance of any life beyond the
space of a year. [HAWKINS, J.-If a servant be hired for a term
of five years, the death of that servant is an event which may
possibly happen within the year, and which would, of course,
determine the service.] The case of Ely v. The Positive Government Security Life Insurance Company is no doubt against the
plaintiff, but it stands alone; the cases on the subject were not
fully cited on the argument, and in the Court of Appeal,
Law Rep. 1 Ex. D. 58, the court expressly refused to decide
the ease on the ground of the Statute of Frauds. There are many
cases in favor of the plaintiff's contention: Peter v. Compton,
Smith's Leading Cases, 7th ed., vol. 1, p. 335; .Fentonv. Emblers,
3 Burr. 1279; .Ridley v. Ridley, 13 W. R. 763; Wells v. .Horton,
4 Bing. 40 ; Gilbert v. Sykes, 16 East 150 ; Souch v. Strawbridge,
2 C. B. 808; Murphy v. O'Sullivan, 11 Ir. Jur. N. S. 111;
-Farringtonv. Donohue, Ir. R. 1 C. L. 675, is distinguishable,
inasmuch as the continuance of the arrangement for a longer period
than one year was clearly indicated.
A. Charles, Q. C.-This is not a case where any presumption of
the continuance of life is necessarily set up; it is merely a question of the intention of the parties. They clearly intended the
arrangement to last over a longer period than one year: Boydell
v. Drummond, 11 East 142, is in my favor.
HAWKINS, J.-I am of opinion that the contracts fall within the
4th section of the Statute of Frauds, as agreements "not to be
performed within the space of one year from the making thereof."
Upon the first contract for three years it is impossible to raise a
doubt. The case, however, has been argued as though it rested
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upon a new contract of employment for an indefinite period, after
the expiration of the three years, and an agreement on the defendant's part never after that employment should cease to set up
business as a tailor or outfitter within five miles of Devonport.
As thus presented, ] have considered the case.
The law upon the subject is now well established. A contract
which, according to its terms, is primafacie not to be performed
within a year, is not the less within the statute because it is made
defeasible by a contingency which may occur within that period.
Thus a contract of service for two years is none the less within the
statute because it is made determinable by the death of either of
the parties, or by notice, or by the misconduct of the servant at
any period of the service. Dobson v. Collis is an express authority
to this effect. Boberts v. Tucker is a striking authority in support
of the same doctrine. That was an action by a stipendiary curate
against the incumbent of a parish, founded upon an alleged promise
made by the defendant to the plaintiff "to take all necessary
measures for obtaining the payment of an annual grant from the
Society for Promoting the Employment of Additional Curates, in
each and every year," &c. At the trial before Mr. Justice COLTMAN he nonsuited the plaintiff, upon the ground that the contract
fell within the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds. On motion
to set aside the nonsuit, Baron PARKxE and Baron ALDERSON
upheld the ruling, the latter saying, "The case of a defeasible
contract, where the contract may be defeated or put an end to
within the year, is not for that reason taken out of the operation
of the Statute of Frauds." Sweet v. Lee further illustrates the
same now well-recognised proposition. There the contract was for
an annuity for life, and the court held it to be within the 4th
section, though it might, by the death of the annuitant, be terminated at any time. Upon the same principle, in -Farringtonv.
Donohue, it was decided that a verbal agreement to maintain a
child aged five years until she was able to do for herself, was within
the statute, although the child might die within a year, for it was
clear that, if she lived, the contract was not to be-that is, could
not be-in the contemplation of anybody, performed within that
period. The same view was taken by this court in -Ely v. The
Positive Assurance Company, where it was held that the engagement of the plaintiff as solicitor to the company during his whole
professional life, and so long as the defendants continued a company,
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was a contract not to be performed within a year, though it might
be determined by the death or resignation of the plaintiff himself,
or by his dismissal for his misconduct within that period.
On the other hand, a contract which prima facie and from its
terms may be performed within a year, however improbable that it
will be so, and even though the parties at the time of making it
expected its endurance beyond that period, does not fall within the
statute, and it is immaterial that the performance of it is, by the
natural course of events, delayed for a much longer period. The
most familiar illustration of this proposition is the case of a servant
hired generally, whose service may be determined by reasonable
notice at any time. Such a contract does not fall within the statute,
though the service may continue and the contract remain unterminated for many years: .Bee8ton v. Collyer, 4 Bing. 309. .Fenton
v. Enmbler8 well illustrates the law in this respect. That was an
action brought by the plaintiff against the executor of a person
named May, upon a promise of May, by his last will and testament to give and bequeath to the plaintiff a legacy or annuity of
161. by the year, to be paid and payable to her yearly and every
year from the day of the decease of the said May for and during
the term of her natural life. It was objected that this agreement
was within the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, and ought to
have been in writing, for that it was not to be performed within a
year, since a whole year from May's death was to elapse before the
annuity would become payable. It was answered, however, that
the action was brought for May's not having done what he ought to
have done in his lifetime, viz., made his will, which might have
been done within the year. Mr. Justice DENIsON said: "The
statute does not extend to cases where the thing may be performed
within the year," and Mr. Justice WILMOT said: "The statute only
extends to such promises where, by the express appointment of the
party, the thing is not to be performed within a year." See also
_Ridley v. Bidley. Souch v. Strawbrie was an action for the
maintenance of a child placed by the defendant in 1842 under the
care of the plaintiff, upon an agreement to pay 58. per week, or one
guinea per month, until the defendant gave notice, or as long as
the defendant should think proper. The child remained with the
plaintiff until 1845. The Court of Common Pleas held that the
case was not within the statute, for there was no certain time fixed
for the duration of the contract, but it was to endure for an indefi-
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nite period, subject to be put an end to at any time at the option of
the defendant, and that contingency might defeat the contract
within a year. Upon the same principle Knowlman v. Bluett was
decided in this court. There the contract was that the plaintiff
should take charge of seven illegitimate children, of which the
defendant was the father, and that the defendant should give her
3001. a year, payable quarterly, to keep them. The court held the
case not to be within the statute, for the reason given by Mr.
Baron BRAMWELL, namely: that "the sum may be called an
annuity, but really the engagement was not binding on either party
for any definite space of time," and that the defendant might at the
end of any quarter have refused to provide for the maintenance of
the children any longer, and in like manner the plaintiff might
have declined to take charge of them. The contract might have
been performed within the year, though no doubt both parties
expected it would last longer. This judgment was appealed against;
but the appeal was disposed of upon another ground.
In the case now before us, the contract set out in the statement
of claim amounts to an agreement on the defendant's part not to set
up the trade of a tailor or outfitter within five miles of Devonport,
during the joint lives of himself and the plaintiff. Prima facie,
therefore, it was not to be performed within a year, and therefore
falls within the operation of the 4th section of the Statute of
Frauds. My judgment, therefore, is for the defendant.
The inclination of the American
courts is quite adverse to the construction of the statute adopted in the foreWith us the phrase a
going case.
contract "not to be performed," has
generally been considered to mean a
contract which cannot, and not merely
one that may not be performed within a
year; a contract which it will be, and.
always must be absolutely impossible to
perform in that time, and not merely
one which both parties expect may not
be so accomplished; a contract which
must continue over a year, and not
merely one which may embrace many
years. The fact that it extends through
many years before its accomplishment,
is not decisive that it is within the statute. The question still is, was it a con-

tract which, at the time of making,
clearly could not and must not be performed within that time. It is not that
looking backwards, we see that the contract has not been fulfilled in a year,
but whether looking forward from the
time of making, we could then say it was
not to be performed.
It is immaterial what is the maximum
time of possible duration, as expected
by the parties, but the question is, what
is the minimum time, within which it
can be performed. Is that more than a
year ? The criterion is not whether the
promisor has the right by the terms of
the contract, if he chooses, to perform
it within many years, but whether the
promisee has no right to demand, and
can not receive full performance within
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one year. In the last case the contract
must always be within the statute, in
the other it may not be. But all this
is elementary.
Perhaps this view is more obvious,
when the contract itself contains on its
face a clause which shows that it may be
performed within a year, although it
may continue much longer. Thus, on
a contract to labor for a company "for
the term of five years, or so long as A.
shall continue to be the agent of the
company," it was held that the statute
did not apply, and that the legal effect
of the contract was to serve so long
as A. should be the agent of the company, not to exceed five years in all.
And as possibly A. might not continue
more than a year, the contract might
be performed within that time ; or it
might not, but as it might, it could
not be called a contract, which was not
to be performed in that time: Roberts v.
Rockbottom Co., 7 Met. 46 (1843).
For a similar reason, a contract by
R. to print goods for H. at cost, "1two
years or longer, if necessary, until H.
shall make $50,000," is not within
the statute, since possibly, so far as the
terms of the contract indicate, H. might
make the $50,000 in one year, although
most probably he would not: Hodges v.
Richmond lan. Co., 9 R. L 482 (1870).
So in MfcLees v. Hale, 10 Wend. 428
(1833), the defendant had only agreed
with the plaintiff to support a certain
child, then about six months old, until
it should be five or six years old, "or
so long as the child should be chargeable to the town of Greenfield," of
which the defendant was an overseer;
and it was held not within the statute by
reason of the contingency, as the child
might not continue chargeable to that
town for a year, or even a month.
And if this construction be correct,
when the contract upon itsface, contains
a clause or condition by which it may
be fulfilled within a year, it is argued,
why may it not be also true, where a
similar condition or clause is implied by

law. In the latter, the contract may be
said to be as much legally performed as
in the former.
Thus it was held in Peters v. Westborough, 19 Pick. 364 (1837), that an
oral contract to support a person, then
only twelve years old, "until she was
eighteen," was not void under the statute, since it would have been fully performed at her death, which might have
occurred within a year from the time of
making; and that in order to bring a
parol agreement within the statute, it
must have been expressly stipulated by
the parties, or it must appear to have
been understood by them, that the agreement was not to be performed within a
year, which stipulation or undertakkng must be absolute and certain, and
not dependent upon any contingency.
Precisely similar are the cases of
Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 46 Me. 154
(1858); Wiggins v. Kizer, 6 Ind. 252
(1855); Dresser v. Dresser, 35 Barb.
573 (1862) ; Heath v. Heath, 31 Wis.
223 (1872); Bull v. McCrea, 8 B.
Mon. 422 (1848) ; Howard v. Burgen, 4
Dana 137 (1836); Ellicott v. Peterson,
4 Md. 476 (1853) ; Murphy v. O'Sullivan, 11 Irish Jur. N. S. 111 (1866),
an excellent case on this subject.
In some of these cases the contract
was to support a person "for life ;" in
others for a stated term of years ; but in
all it was thought that the death of the
party to be supported would terminate
all liability under the contract, and so
it might be performed within a year; and
no distinction was made between the two
cases. Whereas, in Farringtonv. Donohoe, 1 Irish C. L. R. 679 (1866), it was
said there was a material difference;
that the one was within 'he statute and
the other not.
But so long as the legal force of the
contract can extend only during the life
of some person, although it nominally
extends through a period of years,
which may be much longer than such
life, there seems to be no more reason
for considering the contract within the
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statute, than if the contract had been
expressed to be simply "for the life"
of such person ; to which all agree the
statute does not apply. For such an
agreement is similar to a contract to
pay money, or leave the promisee a
legacy, at the promisor's death ; for
though that event may not happen for
many years, it may occur in one: Fenton v. Emblers, 3 Burr. 1278 ; Kent v.
Kent, 62 N. Y. 560 ; Riddle v. Bak-us,
38 Iowa 81; Frost v. Tarr, 53 Ind.
390; Jilson v. Gilbert, 26 Wis. 637;
Updike v. Ten JBroeck, 32 N. J.L. 105 ;
Ridley v. Ridley, 34 Bear. 478 ; Vells
v. Horton, 4 Bing. 40; 12 Moore 176;
Thompson v. Gordon, 3 Strobh. 196.
For somewhat similar reasons a contract "not hereafter to engage in the
staging or livery-stable business in S.,"
though unlimited as to time, was held
not within the statute, since it would be
in force and could continue only until
the death of the defendant, and as that
might happen within a year from the
time of making the contract, it would
then be fully performed, and so the statute
did not apply: Lyon v. King, 11 Mete.
411 (1846) ; Worthy v. Jones, 11 Gray
168 (1858) ; Blanding v. Sargent, 33
N. H. 239 (1856) ; Richardson v.
Pierce, 7 R. I. 330 (1862) ; Hill v.
Jamieson, 16 Ind. 125 (1861); Foster
v. McO'Blenis, 18 Mo. 88 (1853);
Blanchardv. Weeks, 34 Vt. 589 (1861).
And the same rule applies where the
contract is express not to engage in a
certain business for the next five years
after making: Doyle v. Dixon, 97 Mass.
208 (1867).
These cases are certainly at variance
with the views expressed in our principal case. The reason of them all seems
to be that the contract may be fully performed within a year. Jt would be fully
performed if the death of the party
should occur within that time; no
duties or obligations would be imposed
upon the personal representatives of the
promisor, or extend beyond his life,
and therefore in a legal sense the con-

tract would be fully performed at his
death.
The argument upon which some of
these cases have been decided would
seem to lead to the conclusion, that if A.
orally agrees to work for B. for five
years, this means five years, if he lives
so long; and that if he should die within
a year, the contract would be fully performed ; and therefore that as by an
implied contingency it might be performed within a year, itwould not be
within the statute ; and so that A. would
be liable to B. for breach of contract if
he should refuse to work at all, or leave
without good cause after having commenced. This conclusion seems a fair
inference from the previous cases, unless
the fact that in the latter the contract is
positive to do a certain thing for a certain period, and in the other to refrain
from doing it, makes a material difference. The argument, briefly stated, is
this : A contract to labor for another
"for the life" of the promisor is not
within the statute. A contract to labor
"for five years, or for the life of the
promisor," is the same. In a contract
to labor for another simply " for five
years," the law annexes the condition
that itis for the promisor's life only,
and therefore the result should be the
same, as if ithad been expressed in the
contract itself.
But the principle has never been extended so far ; and it seems to be universally agreed or conceded, that a
contract to labor for more than a year
is within the statute, although there
could be no liability upon the personal
representatives of the promisor, for
damages, if he should die within the
time, and so not, in one sense, fulfil his
contract. See Bracegirdle v. Heald, 1
B. & Aid. 727; Drummond v.Burnell,
13 Wend. 308; Shiute v. Dorr, 5
Wend. 214; Tuttle v. Lovett, 31 Me.
655; Kelly v. Terrell, 26 Ga. 551;
Sluire v. Whipple, 1 Vt. 69; Scroggin
Black-well, 36 Ala. 351 ;Emery v. Smith,
46 N. H. 151; Comes v. Lamson, 16
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Conn. 248; Giraud v. Richmond, 2 C.
B. 335; Snlling v. Jluntingfield, I C.,
M. & It. 20; .ones v. H1omer, 2 Hilt.
116; Amburger v. Marvin, 4 E. D.
Smith 393.
The Yeason is said to be that wherever
the death of a person within a year
merely prevents full performance, the
case is within the statute ; but if his
death would leave the agreement completely performed, and its purpose fully
carried out, it is not ; for wherever the
agreement can not be completely performed within a year, the mere fact that
it may be terminated, or complete performance excused, or rendered impossible by the death of some person within
a year, is not sufficient to take the
contract out of the statute. The distinction is subtle, but it is real and
well-settled.
The difference between the English
and the American view seems to be what
is the meaning of the word " performed." If by performance is meant,
"forming through," carrying it all out,
executing it through the whole stipulated period, then a clause or condition
by which it might be terminated, rescinded, or revoked by either party within
a year, would not save it from the operation of the statute, as was distinctly
held in Dobson v. Collis, 1 H. & N..81.
If, on the other hand, the party has a
legal right, either by an express stipulation in the contract, or by operation of
law, to put an end to the contract within
a year, and does so, why is not the contract performed? The maximum time
of the contract is not completed, to be
sure, bt the provision for an earlier
termination of it, either by contract or
by law, is as much a part of the original
contract as any other, and therefore the
whole contract may be said to be performed, accomplished, completed. In
one sense of the word performance, the
contract in Peters v. Westborough, 19
Pick. 364, to support a child "1until he
was eighteen years old" would not be
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performed if he died at sixteen ; that is :o
say, there was not a complete and full
execution of the maximum obligation of
the defendant ; there was not a full performance in one sense of the word ; but
any longer or larger performance was
excused, made impossible indeed, and
therefore, in a legal sense, there might
be a fall and complete performance. It
is not easy to reconcile this case with
the English decisions referred to in our
principal z.ase ; but it has fairly given
tone and color to the American law,
on this particular point.
It should not be forgotten, however,
that a different view has sometimes been
taken even in the American courts, and
it has here been sometimes held that if
the contract is by its terms primafacie
to ran for a term of years, it is within
the statute, although it contain a clause
by which it may be terminated within a
year. The most notable of this class,
perhaps, is that of Packet Co. v. Sickles,
5 Wall. 580 (1866).
In this case
Sickles agreed to attach a patented fuel
contrivance to the Washington Steam
Packet Co.'s steamboat, which the comwere to use on their boat "during the
continuance of the patent, if the boat
should last so long; and pay therefor,
weekly, three-fourths of the value of the
fuel saved thereby." In fact the patent
had, at the sale of the contract, twelve
years to run; but nothing was said
about that in the contract itself. It was
held, that the contract was within the
statute, notwithstanding it might not
continue more than a year, by reason
of the loss of the boat within that time;
and the English cases of Birch v. Earl
of Liverpool, 9 B. & C. 891 ; and Dobson v. Collis, I H. & N. 81, were prinpally relied upon.
In view of the conflicting opinions of
eminent tribunals upon this question,
it must be confessed the law is in a very
unsatisfactory state upon this delicate
point.
EDMUND H. BENNETT.

